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Author Topic: https://tinyurl.com/PGP-DennisLeeWilson - My public PGP keys  (Read 33063 times)
DennisLeeWilson
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« on: 2008-December-06 04:15:55 PM »

My public PGP keys
https://tinyurl.com/PGP-DennisLeeWilson
http://dennisleewilson.com/simplemachinesforum/index.php?topic=47.msg147#msg147


My PGP machine is currently not working. Please contact me with open text before attempting to send encrypted email.  Dennis


From: DennisLeeWilson-Ariz-Wyo  (Original Message) Sent: 10/12/2004 1:26 PM

I will NOT attempt to open a PGP encrypted message from my cell phone! Neither should you. I expect that keying in the password on a cell phone would be like telling the whole world what it is.


2004-10-12 My public PGP key

DennisLeeWilson@Yahoo.com


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com>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=cHGi
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
 




I chose PGP Version 6.5.8 because it was created while Phil Zimmerman was still at Network Associates, Inc (NAI). The PGP software was later taken over by McAfee and apparently even later by Semantics (Norton). Semantics has taken over the link at http://www.pgp.com . I would not trust ANYTHING downloaded from that site.

And The International PGP Home Page at http://www.pgpi.org/ contains all manner of REVISED PGP software.

The version of PGP that *I* trust is Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8. I am running it successfully on Windows XP and I do not know why "someone" at McAfee thought a "newer" version (PGP 8.0) was needed in order to "fully support Windows XP". It sure sounds like a scam to me. McAfee and Semantics (Norton) have made fortunes eradicating viruses and malware, the source of which has never been explained to my satisfaction.

Ask yourself the following (put on your tinfoil hat, wrap yourself in a skeptical attitude and think about who gains by making changes to PGP):

     WHY do newer versions exist when the older ones work just fine?
     WHO created them--or perhaps who REALLY created them?
     WHAT changes were made in them, how many people have actually READ AND VERIFIED THE CHANGES, and does the executable REALLY match the source?

Version 6.5.8 is available at http://www.pgpi.org/news/#20010324 along with many other versions and NEWS. See the note that is titled "[25 Aug 2000] PGP 6.5.8 available for download". Be sure to read the NEWS items. They did NOT instill a sense of security in me. It looks like the later versions have "bug" fixes of various types. Even 6.5.8 is "vulnerable" if you are stupid enough to give out your PRIVATE key! See [24 Mar 2001] Security flaw in OpenPGP key format

  • A Czech information security firm has found a security flaw in the OpenPGP key format, as used by PGP, GnuPG and other PGP implemenations. The flaw makes it possible for an attacker to forge a PGP signature if he/she can get hold of your private key...

If you cannot locate a 6.5.8 version--or don't trust what you get, send me an email and I will forward a copy of mine. I have had it for a long time--before changes started coming every 6 months.



(Two of) my BitMessage addresses:
BitMessage: Not yet ready for prime time, but definitely on the right track!


My attempt to install the Beta version of BitMessage FAILED. See details at following link:
http://dennisleewilson.com/simplemachinesforum/index.php?topic=693.msg1613#msg1613


BM-2cXq5Eywsuk4hY9XsYFuqHigj8uSWmW3xb  <--I cannot receive at this address. Lost my "Identities" folder and cannot "fix" it.
BM-2cVZoQR3tcT634QSMniJsYA3z49qsFAE7F

 

2013-11-24 My public GnuGP key--I am using WAS ATTEMPTING TO USE Thunderbird to access the following Yahoo account. The attempt failed to install properly. PLEASE DO NOT USE THIS. I RETAIN IT TEMPORARILY ONLY FOR EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSES.

DennisLeeWilson@Yahoo.com


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32)
Comment: A revocation certificate should follow

iQEfBCABAgAJBQJSks8iAh0CAAoJEKvLoueIm1Pn1s0H/ihIULEv2vipRtLkS7hJ
V9FtSEjJCK2ShpCQ5sgbRaCiM0/O5T16EJG88Av0aSYysWlNIqrjRTZdK4+6XZwU
ZLSmS2snmXS8KeNnUmESBCvcdIzErIOS1YfCNLZHRfGSBpSubL4Ly7EMVfDHGILg
DnYgy3VkZgGKmWfZ3N7lYLnTf9qA1bZoXSAdm9BdP+3l7rI5Nu6Ki7GiVBZkFZrq
ukNpW660xMx3DKh4lFUdo1mQWYjP0hp5rVgSsU6X813PJCUkymmzkE3hMo6KfCDR
34EgWTu4m3E7PZphvsrif9jSfTumwaKBYW3oWr09kUTkar9jdzhBxSI9gLXTKPte
tL4=
=+fK6
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
 

« Last Edit: 2016-March-18 04:33:07 PM by DennisLeeWilson » Logged

Objectivist & Sovereign Individual
Creator of Atlas Shrugged Celebration Day & Artemis Zuna Trading Post
Signatory: Covenant of Unanimous Consent
DennisLeeWilson
Creator of this site
Administrator
Forum/Blog Owner
*****
Posts: 1331


Existence exists & Man's mind can know it.


WWW Email
« Reply #1 on: 2008-December-07 06:57:10 PM »

From: DennisLeeWilson-Ariz-Wyo Sent: 5/7/2006 4:20 PM
My public key (above) is still valid but I have discovered something that makes encryption reeeaaalllyy easy!
 
I've been trying out my new Hushmail email account as described in the article at

http://www.ncc-1776.org/tle2006/tle366-20060507-04.html

I've used PGP for encrypted email on my Yahoo account, but it is
pretty involved invoking the manual encryption/decryption. Hush
mail automates all that. It is sooooo sweet. It is SOOOOO UNSECURE!!!!

Something to consider: Use a really long password with upper/lower,
numbers and special characters--and keep it buried in an obscurely named
text (.txt) file on a USB Flash drive so it can be easily copied
and pasted when needed (something I could NOT do before), but removed
from your computer when you shut down.

Looking forward to encrypted messages from you--an idea whose time
came a long time ago. Welcome to the 21st Century.

Write #$%$s$#^&^*^1j*(&^$4 soon.
 
DennisLeeWilson@Hush.ai

From: DennisLeeWilson-Ariz-Wyo Sent: 8/12/2007 7:46 PM

I no longer maintain my Hushmail account.

Hushmail has been shown to NOT be secure!! SEE ARTICLES BELOW! Use at your own risk!! Better yet, do NOT USE for any purpose!!

 
Any email, encrypted or not, should be addressed to me at
DennisLeeWilson@Yahoo.com
« Last Edit: 2012-July-27 02:13:39 PM by DennisLeeWilson » Logged

Objectivist & Sovereign Individual
Creator of Atlas Shrugged Celebration Day & Artemis Zuna Trading Post
Signatory: Covenant of Unanimous Consent
DennisLeeWilson
Creator of this site
Administrator
Forum/Blog Owner
*****
Posts: 1331


Existence exists & Man's mind can know it.


WWW Email
« Reply #2 on: 2012-July-27 01:46:41 PM »

Link to this article..:
http://dennisleewilson.com/simplemachinesforum/index.php?topic=47.msg1309#msg1309

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/pgp-creator-def/

PGP Creator Defends Hushmail

    * By Ryan Singel
    * Email Author
    * November 19, 2007 |
    * 1:47 pm |
    * Categories: Hacks and Cracks, privacy
    


Phil Zimmermann, the coder who created the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) email encryption scheme in 1991, defended encrypted online webmail company Hushmail’s turning over of the unscrambled emails to the government when given a court order, arguing it is not reasonable to expect that online encrypted email storage is as safe as using encryption software on one’s own computer.

Zimmermann, who sits on Hushmail’s advisory board, spoke to THREAT LEVEL after we published a piece contrasting the site’s promises that it had no access to the contents of customers’ encrypted emails stored on their servers with a court case showing that the Canadian company turned over 12 CDs of readable emails to U.S. authorities.

Zimmermann is also the brains behind Zfone, software that works with VOIP services to make encrypted online phone calls possible.

"If your threat model includes the government coming in with all of force of the government and compelling service provider to do things it wants them to do, then there are ways to obtain the plaintext of an email ," Zimmermann said in a phone interview. "Just because encryption is involved, that doesn’t give you a talisman against a prosecutor. They can compel a service provider to cooperate."

Hushmail offers two ways to use its encrypted email service — both of which Hushmail now indicates can be eavesdropped on following a court order.

One, the now default, does the encryption work on Hushmail’s server and works largely like regular webmail. The second, original method uses a Java applet that runs in the user’s browser that takes care of the decryption and encryption of messages on his computer, after the user types in the right passphrase. In this case, messages reach Hushmail’s server already encrypted.  The Java code also decrypts the message on the recipient’s computer, so an unencrypted copy never crosses the internet or hits Hushmails servers.

The simple webmail version exposes a user’s passkey to Hushmail briefly, explaining how the company is able to comply with legal orders served on the company for users that choose that option.

Though Zimmermann knows nothing of the DEA case or how Hushmail decrypts emails in response to court orders, he said there are technical ways Hushmail could unscramble a customer’s accounts, no matter which way they use Hushmail.

"You could have a different, modified Java applet delivered to the user, for example," Zimmermann said.

But there are counter-measures a user could take to prevent being served a rogue Java applet, Zimmermann said.

"You could keep a digital signature of it or a cyrptographic strong hash and compare it each time, or you could keep your own copy and  hopefully the copy you got before was the proper one," Zimmermann said.

But, Zimmermann stressed, the company only undoes encryption when given a Canadian court order and is not turning over customer records wholesale to government agencies.

"It would be suicidal for their business model if they did that," Zimmermann said. "Their hearts are in the right place but there are certain kinds of attacks that are beyond the scope of their abilities to thwart. They are not a sovereign state."

Last week, THREAT LEVEL reported that Hushmail’s architecture does let the company unscramble user’s accounts and may be able to do so even with the version that requires users to use a hefty Java applet in their browsers to do the encrypting and decrypting.

  • Hushmail, a longtime provider of encrypted web-based email, markets itself by saying that "not even a Hushmail employee with access to our servers can read your encrypted e-mail, since each message is uniquely encoded before it leaves your computer."

    But it turns out that statement seems not to apply to individuals targeted by government agencies that are able to convince a Canadian court to serve a court order on the company.

    A September court document (.pdf) from a federal prosecution of alleged steroid dealers reveals the Canadian company turned over 12 CDs worth of e-mails from three Hushmail accounts, following a court order obtained through a mutual assistance treaty between the U.S. and Canada.

Zimmermann says it would be a shame to damn Hushmail for this compliance, since it remains a useful tool against many other attacks, including protecting individuals from oppressive foreign governments who will have a tough time convincing a Canadian court to issue a search warrant on its behalf.

"If you are in a hotel room in Khazakstan or Russia and want to check your mail and you have a laptop, you could be running the Java applet or even running it through SSL," Zimmermann said. "The behavior of the Hushmail servers is not going to be influenced by the local government where you are sitting in the hotel."

See Also:

    * Hushmail To Warn Users of Law Enforcement Backdoor
    * Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds -- [copied below]

Photo: Courtesy of Phil Zimmermann
« Last Edit: 2013-June-18 01:38:09 PM by DennisLeeWilson » Logged

Objectivist & Sovereign Individual
Creator of Atlas Shrugged Celebration Day & Artemis Zuna Trading Post
Signatory: Covenant of Unanimous Consent
DennisLeeWilson
Creator of this site
Administrator
Forum/Blog Owner
*****
Posts: 1331


Existence exists & Man's mind can know it.


WWW Email
« Reply #3 on: 2012-July-27 02:06:17 PM »

Link to this article..:
http://dennisleewilson.com/simplemachinesforum/index.php?topic=47.msg1310#msg1310

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/#previouspost
Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds

    * By Ryan Singel
    * Email Author
    * November 7, 2007 |
    * 3:39 pm |
    * Categories: Crime, Hacks and Cracks
 


Hushmail, a longtime provider of encrypted web-based email, markets itself by saying that "not even a Hushmail employee with access to our servers can read your encrypted e-mail, since each message is uniquely encoded before it leaves your computer."

But it turns out that statement seems not to apply to individuals targeted by government agencies that are able to convince a Canadian court to serve a court order on the company.

A September court document (.pdf) from a federal prosecution of alleged steroid dealers reveals the Canadian company turned over 12 CDs worth of e-mails from three Hushmail accounts, following a court order obtained through a mutual assistance treaty between the U.S. and Canada. The charging document alleges that many Chinese wholesale steroid chemical providers, underground laboratories and steroid retailers do business over Hushmail.

The court revelation demonstrates a privacy risk in a relatively-new, simple webmail offering by Hushmail, which the company acknowledges is less secure than its signature product.

A subsequent and refreshingly frank e-mail interview with Hushmail’s CTO seems to indicate that government agencies can also order their way into individual accounts on Hushmail’s ultra-secure web-based e-mail service, which relies on a browser-based Java encryption engine.

Since its debut in 1999, Hushmail has dominated a unique market niche for highly-secure webmail with its innovative, client-side encryption engine.

Hushmail uses industry-standard cryptographic and encryption protocols (OpenPGP  and AES 256)  to scramble the contents of messages stored on their servers. They also host the public key needed for other people using encrypted email services to send secure messages to a Hushmail account.

The first time a Hushmail user logs on, his browser downloads a Java applet that takes care of the decryption and encryption of messages on his computer, after the user types in the right passphrase. So messages reach Hushmail’s server already encrypted.  The Java code also decrypts the message on the recipient’s computer, so an unencrypted copy never crosses the internet or hits Hushmails servers.

In this scenario, if a law enforcement agency demands all the e-mails sent to or from an account, Hushmail can only turn over the scrambled messages since it has no way of reversing the encryption.

However, installing Java and loading and running the Java applet can be annoying. So in 2006, Hushmail began offering a service more akin to traditional web mail. Users connect to the service via a SSL (https://) connection and Hushmail runs the Encryption Engine on their side. Users then tell the server-side engine what the right passphrase is and all the messages in the account can then be read as they would in any other web-based email account.

The rub of that option is that Hushmail has — even if only for a brief moment — a copy of your passphrase. As they disclose in the technical comparison of the two options, this means that an attacker with access to Hushmail’s servers can get at the passphrase and thus all of the messages.

In the case of the alleged steroid dealer, the feds seemed to compel Hushmail to exploit this hole, store the suspects’ secret passphrase or decryption key, decrypt their messages and hand them over.

Hushmail CTO Brian Smith declined to talk about any specific law enforcement requests, but described the general vulnerability to THREAT LEVEL in an e-mail interview (You can read the entire e-mail thread here):

  • The key point, though, is that in the non-Java configuration, private key and passphrase operations are performed on the server- side.

    This requires that users place a higher level of trust in our servers as a trade off for the better usability they get from not having to install Java and load an applet.

    This might clarify things a bit when you are considering what actions we might be required to take under a court order. Again, I stress that our requirement in complying with a court order is that we not take actions that would affect users other than those specifically named in the order.

Hushmail’s marketing copy largely glosses over this vulnerability, reassuring users that the non-Java option is secure.

  • Turning on Java provides an additional layer of security, but is not necessary for secure communication using this system[...]

    Java allows you to keep more of the sensitive operations on your local machine, adding an extra level of protection. However, as all communication with the webserver is encrypted, and sensitive data is always encrypted when stored on disk, the non-Java option also provides a very high level of security.

But can the feds force Hushmail to modify the Java applet sent to a particular user, which could then capture and sends the user’s passphrase to Hushmail, then to the government?

Hushmail’s own threat matrix includes this possibility, saying that if an attacker got into Hushmail’s servers, they could compromise an account — but that "evidence of the attack" (presumably the rogue Java applet) could be found on the user’s computer.

Hushmail’s Smith:

  • (T)he difference being that in Java mode, what the attacker does is potentially detectable by the user (via view source in the browser).

"View source" would not be enough to detect a bugged Java applet, but a user could to examine the applet’s runtime code and  the source code for the Java applet is publicly available for review. But that doesn’t mean a user could easily verify that the applet served up by Hushmail was compiled from the public source code.

Smith concurs and hints that Hushmail’s Java architecture doesn’t technically prohibit the company from being able to turn over unscrambled emails to cops with court orders.

  • You are right about the fact that view source is not going to reveal anything about the compiled Java code. However, it does reveal the HTML in which the applet is embedded, and whether the applet is actually being used at all. Anyway, I meant that just as an example. The general point is that it is potentially detectable by the end-user, even though it is not practical to perform this operation every time. This means that in Java mode the level of trust the user must place in us is somewhat reduced, although not eliminated.

    The extra security given by the Java applet is not particularly relevant, in the practical sense, if an individual account is targeted. (emphasis added) [...]

Hushmail won’t protect law violators being chased by patient law enforcement officials, according to Smith.

  • [Hushmail] is useful for avoiding general Carnivore-type government surveillance, and protecting your data from hackers, but definitely not suitable for protecting your data if you are engaging in illegal activity that could result in a Canadian court order.

    That’s also backed up by the fact that all Hushmail users agree to our terms of service, which state that Hushmail is not to be used for illegal activity. However, when using Hushmail, users can be assured that no access to data, including server logs, etc., will be granted without a specific court order.

Smith also says that it only accepts court orders issued by the British Columbia Supreme Court and that non-Canadian cops have to make a formal request to the Canadian government whose Justice Department then applies, with sworn affidavits, for a court order.

  • We receive many requests for information from law enforcement authorities, including subpoenas, but on being made aware of the requirements, a large percentage of them do not proceed.

    To date, we have not challenged a court order in court, as we have made it clear that the court orders that we would accept must follow our guidelines of requiring only actions that can be limited to the specific user accounts named in the court order. That is to say, any sort of requirement for broad data collection would not be acceptable.

I was first tipped to this story via the Cryptography Mailing List, and Kevin, who had been talking with Hushmail about similar matters involving another case, followed up with Smith. We both agree Hushmail deserves credit for its frank and open replies (.pdf). Such candor is hard to come by these days, especially since most ISPs won’t even tell you how long they hold onto your IP address or if they sell your web-surfing habits to the highest bidders.
« Last Edit: 2012-July-27 02:08:53 PM by DennisLeeWilson » Logged

Objectivist & Sovereign Individual
Creator of Atlas Shrugged Celebration Day & Artemis Zuna Trading Post
Signatory: Covenant of Unanimous Consent
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